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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Constituency (local) campaigning in British general elections has been transformed over the 
last ten years or so.   Firstly, national party headquarters have taken an increasingly large role 
in planning and managing constituency campaigns.  Although the pace of change has varied 
across the major parties, all are heading down the same road.  Secondly, campaigning on the 
ground has also changed.  Technological and other changes have led to a decline in the use of 
traditional campaign techniques and increased use of new methods, especially in ‘key’ seats.   
These developments are charted using data derived from a unique set of nation-wide surveys 
of election agents at the last three general elections.   Finally, the paper returns (briefly) to the 
debate about the electoral effects of constituency campaigning, presenting data relating to its 
impact in each of the three elections concerned.  
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CONSTITUENCY CAMPAIGNING IN BRITAIN 1992-2001: 
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For most of the period after 1945, electioneering in Britain was dominated by the national 
campaign.  Constituency campaigning continued, of course, focusing in particular on polling 
day mobilisation, but it was widely regarded as little more than a side-show and left to local 
enthusiasts to organise and run.   The increasing importance of television led the parties and 
the national media (and academics) to direct their attention almost entirely to the national 
campaign and appeared to sound the death-knell for local campaigning.  In the 1990s, 
however, there was a marked change.  Technological developments significantly improved 
the tools available for fighting local campaigns and central party staff – partly influenced by 
their observation and experience of campaigning in the USA – began to take constituency 
campaigning much more seriously.  In parallel, a significant academic literature began to 
emerge, tracing the changes that were taking place and re-assessing the impact of 
constituency campaigns on election outcomes (see, for example, Denver and Hands, 1997; 
Pattie et al., 1995; Whiteley and Seyd, 1994).  
 
In this article, using the results of surveys of election agents undertaken immediately 
following the general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2001, we explore these developments in 
constituency-level election campaigning.1  First, we consider the changing role of the parties’ 
headquarters and national officials in local campaigning; second, we present evidence about 
the changing nature of these campaigns; and finally, we briefly summarise our evidence 
relating to the electoral impact of constituency campaigning. 
 
The Role of the Centre in Constituency Campaigning 
Before the 1990s, the contribution of party headquarters to constituency campaigns was 
mainly confined to offering training and advice to party workers and providing routine 
‘servicing’.   Nonetheless, party organisers never entirely subscribed to the view that local 
campaigns were irrelevant.  They were aware that winning marginal seats was crucial to their 
chances of winning elections and some attempts were made to improve campaigns in these 
seats by providing help with election literature, financial assistance, and so on. What has 
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emerged over the past ten years, however, is a new relationship between the national and 
local campaigns.  National party professionals now seek to exercise much greater control 
over local campaigning by managing key constituency campaigns in crucial respects and 
integrating them much more closely into the national effort.  This change began first, and has 
gone furthest, in the Labour party. 
 
Labour  
By the early 1990s, having decisively lost three elections in a row, the Labour party was 
desperate to win power and this, no doubt, helps to explain why Labour was at the forefront 
of new developments in respect of constituency campaigning. For the 1992 election, party 
headquarters put greater thought and effort into planning and organising the campaigns in the 
constituencies than ever before.  This also reflected a more professional approach  associated 
with the more general modernisation of the party.  Two years before the election, about 150 
‘key’ seats were identified and a ‘Key Seats Unit’ established at headquarters, with a team of 
around 40 people. From then until the election efforts were concentrated on these 
constituencies.  Each was visited by a member of the Key Seats Unit to ensure that a 
campaign team was in place and to map out a campaign strategy.  In addition, 20 special 
organisers were appointed by headquarters a year or more in advance of the election to look 
after groups of key seats on the ground.  They worked full-time in the constituencies 
concerned galvanising the local organisation, bringing professional expertise to their 
campaigns, monitoring progress and reporting to the centre. 
 
These changes marked a new departure, but they were surpassed in 1997 by an even more 
sophisticated and ambitious central strategy, code-named ‘Operation Victory’, which was 
launched in the autumn of 1995.  A Key Seats Unit was again established and a list of 90 key 
seats drawn up.  Labour’s campaigns in these seats then provided the focus of the party’s 
efforts at all levels.  All other seats were designated ‘majority seats’ and in these campaigns 
were to be low-cost and low-energy, so that resources - especially volunteer workers - could 
be released to the campaigns in key seats.  All constituencies were expected to fall in with the 
overall strategy.  As in 1992, temporary special organisers recruited, trained and paid for by 
the centre were placed in key constituencies, but now there was one for almost every key 
seat.  Trade union assistance was also organised much more effectively than before, with a 
union co-ordinator being appointed in each key seat. 
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The radically new element in Labour’s strategy in 1997, however, was a mass telephone 
‘voter identification’ campaign in the 18 months before the election.  Telephone banks were 
established in party offices across the country and were used by volunteers to contact voters 
in the key seats.  Using a centrally-designed script-cum-questionnaire, callers identified target 
groups of voters and subsequently these were re-contacted by telephone, sent appropriate 
direct mail communications at regular intervals and visited in person by local campaign 
workers.  Thus, Operation Victory involved not only targeting key constituencies but also, for 
the first time, identifying key groups of voters on whom constituency campaigns were to 
focus attention. 
 
Central preparations for the 2001 election began in 1999 with the establishment of a task 
force to plan and organise constituency campaigns.  Labour now had a huge majority in the 
House of Commons and was riding high in the opinion polls but there were fears of a poor 
turnout among Labour supporters. The new strategy, known as ‘Operation Turnout’, was 
intended to prevent this happening.  Any constituency could ‘opt in’ to the programme of 
activity defined by Operation Turnout but in practice attention was focused on 148 ‘priority’ 
seats, as the key seats were now called.  Although the large number of seats involved meant 
that there had to be some doubling up, every one had a centrally-appointed organiser attached 
to it. 
 
There were three phases of Operation Turnout in the period before the general election.  The 
first was concerned with identifying target voters - partly by traditional doorstep canvassing 
but mostly by telephone. Constituencies were encouraged and given help to set up their own 
telephone banks in the constituency and there were banks in all eleven regions, staffed by 
volunteers. In addition, in a new departure, from January 2001 onwards around 200 people 
were employed at a national call centre.  The second phase was about 'building relationships 
and delivering the message' and concentrated on ‘weak’ Labour supporters and first-time 
voters – groups in which the problem of low turnout was likely to be worst – who were re-
contacted by telephone and on the doorstep (including by the MP) as well as by direct mail.  
In addition, staff at Labour headquarters used demographic analysis to identify specific post-
code areas within constituencies as worthy of special attention and communicated this 
information to local campaigns, along with suggestions as to campaign themes that should be 
stressed in these areas.  In the third phase of Operation Turnout, constituencies were expected 
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to continue to develop relationships with target voters and to make detailed preparations for 
the election campaign and the polling day operation. 
 
All of this suggests a strategy for constituency campaigning in 2001 which was carefully 
planned and co-ordinated from the centre.  Three specific examples further illustrate the 
leading role played by Labour headquarters.   Firstly, in the Spring of 2001 there was a 
special leaflet delivery, briefly explaining the new rules that had been introduced relating to 
postal voting and including an application form, which could be returned free of charge to the 
party’s central postal votes unit.  These were then despatched to town halls across the country 
and the relevant constituency parties informed.  Around 70,000 applications were processed 
centrally.   Secondly, Labour headquarters prepared 300,000 videos, tailored for the 
constituency concerned, which were sent to 60 of the priority seats to be distributed over the 
last weekend of the campaign.  Finally, on polling day itself, for the first time, Labour’s 
national call centre and regional telephone banks were used to contact and encourage tardy 
voters. 
 
Already in 1992, then, Labour’s central headquarters was playing a significant role in 
directing constituency campaigns.  By 1997 and 2001, however, central management 
assumed such proportions that, to a large extent, the initiative in constituency campaigning, 
certainly in the key seats, had ceased to lie with the local candidate or election agent.  All 
constituencies were expected to follow the centrally-determined strategy.  The effort and 
attention lavished on local campaigning by Labour suggest that there has been a significant 
shift in the centre of gravity of campaigning from the national level to the constituencies.  
Arguably, the local campaign has ceased to be really local and has become part of the larger 
national and nationally-directed campaign. 
 
The Conservatives 
The Conservatives were slower than Labour to see, and take advantage of, the new 
possibilities in constituency campaigning.   The need to do so was less urgent as they were 
electorally dominant during the 1980s and were widely believed to have a formidable 
election machine at constituency level.  In addition, the organisational structure of the party 
inhibited the role that Conservative Central Office (CCO) could play since Constituency 
Associations were autonomous and not amenable to central direction or control.  At best, the 
professionals at party headquarters could coax and encourage people on the ground, but the 
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notion of having a central strategy with which the constituencies were expected to comply 
would have gone against the party’s traditions.  An important consequence of this was that 
the strongest Conservative campaigns were typically mounted in their safest seats since these 
had more members, more volunteers and greater financial resources than more marginal seats 
and were also more likely to employ a full-time professional agent. 
 
In the 1992 election, Central Office’s role with respect to constituency campaigning was still 
fairly traditional. Headquarters staff serviced campaigns as they had always done.  Key seats 
were identified and key officials in these seats given extra training and guidance; 
constituency visits by leading party figures were focused on them.  The long-standing policy 
of encouraging ‘mutual aid’ - the twinning of safe seats with nearby marginals to give 
assistance on a long-term basis - was continued but not to any great effect.  The 
Conservatives did introduce one major innovation at this election - long-distance telephone 
canvassing on a significant scale but this was not a Central Office initiative,  being developed 
and organised by influential figures at constituency level.  Overall, then, in 1992 
Conservative headquarters approached the campaigns in the constituencies with a ‘light 
touch’.  In part this was because of the party’s perceived organisational strength.  At this 
stage there were still some 300 full-time professional constituency agents in place and, along 
with Area Agents, they were trusted to do an effective job.  Headquarters staff conceived of 
their role as being one of facilitating, rather than managing, constituency campaigns.   
 
Having only narrowly won the 1992 election, key figures at CCO realised that change was 
needed.  Soon after the election, a list of about 100 ‘battleground’ seats was compiled and 
these became the focus of the party’s preparations over the next five years and of local efforts 
during the campaign itself.  The first priority was to ensure that each had a professional agent 
in place and, in a very significant development, CCO directly appointed agents in target seats 
without one, paying half or more of the salary costs.  Being on the central payroll, these 
appointees were more likely to be amenable to accepting a nationally-planned strategy than 
their predecessors.  Further resources were also allocated - each target seat was given a new 
computer and an economical service for high-quality printing was made available to all 
constituencies.  This substantial commitment of resources by the centre to constituency 
campaigns was a clear sign that CCO officials were attempting to maximise the efficiency of 
campaigns in target constituencies.   
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In addition, like Labour, the Conservatives’ central targeting strategy in the lead-up to the 
1997 election went beyond a focus on constituencies, for the first time, to target individual 
voters - indeed, the whole strategy was called ‘Battleground Voters’.  CCO set out to create a 
database of two million target voters - 20,000 from each target constituency - utilising the 
results of traditional doorstep canvassing,  telephone canvassing (organised locally, but with 
Central Office providing financial help for the installation of telephone lines and training in 
telephone canvassing techniques) and a series of mail surveys organised from headquarters.  
The database was used in the pre-election period to contact target voters by direct mail from 
the centre and in late 1996 and early 1997 two million personalised letters were sent to target 
voters.  Candidates and local party workers were also expected to use the information 
available from the database and make special efforts to visit ‘swing’ voters personally.  In 
1997, then, CCO clearly moved from merely facilitating constituency campaigns and began  
developing, implementing and managing a coherent national strategy from the centre. 
 
Between 1997 and 2001 the Conservative party’s organisational structure was extensively 
overhauled and one (not unintended) effect of the changes was to give CCO more influence 
over local associations and hence over constituency campaigns.  By 2001 the number of full-
time Conservative constituency agents was down to around 60 (mostly in safe seats). Central 
Office had already started to part-fund constituency agents in 1997, as we have seen, and 
before the 2001 election a further 40 or so were appointed and funded from the centre and 
placed in target seats.  In addition, there was a more radical organisational change: the whole 
of the party’s regional tier of organisation in England was abolished and replaced by 27 Area 
Campaign Directors (ACDs), who were managed from the centre and whose main task was to 
assist constituency associations in planning and organising their campaigns. This innovation 
was intended to bring greater professional expertise to those constituencies where it was most 
needed, to make campaigning the central concern of local parties and to increase the centre’s 
ability to manage constituency campaigns. 
 
Further evidence of a centralising trend can be found in the efforts made by party 
headquarters to ensure that constituency associations had appropriate organisational 
structures in place and were actively planning for the election well in advance.  Associations 
in target seats were expected to set up a campaign team, consisting of ten named officers, 
which was to meet monthly in the build-up to the election.  Agendas for the meetings were 
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issued by CCO which also expected to receive a report covering each agenda item.  ACDs 
were instructed to ensure that key constituencies adhered to this programme.  During the 
campaign itself, progress was monitored at headquarters on the basis of daily e-mail reports 
on target seats from the ACDs. 
 
While they were tackling their organisational problems in these ways, the Conservatives 
continued to extend their use of the latest campaigning techniques.  The 2001 election saw a 
concerted shift towards voter identification by telephone.  About a year before the election, in 
a new departure, the party had a central telephone bank of 60 lines installed at party 
headquarters.  In addition, as in 1997, there was also a direct mail effort from Central Office, 
although this was not as closely targeted as before.  Another innovation at the centre related 
to the design and production of leaflets and posters.  A scheme was initiated whereby local 
associations could buy this material - with the same broad design and colour scheme and 
space for local inserts - and around 550 constituency associations signed up to use it.  For the 
first time, Conservative leaflets and posters across the country looked similar.  A final and 
impressive example of central co-ordination of Conservative constituency campaigns in 2001 
occurred when the election date was announced.  Within a few days, 10,000 leaflets were 
delivered to selected households in each of the target seats. 
 
The role of central headquarters in Conservative constituency campaigning has, then,  
changed rapidly from being largely one of guiding and advising to much more active 
management.  Although they were slower off the mark, by 1997 and 2001 the Conservatives 
were embracing many aspects of the new approach to campaigning wholeheartedly.  In part, 
this was necessitated by a decline in the number of professional agents in the constituencies, 
but it was also a recognition of the fact that Conservative constituency campaigns needed to 
be more effectively targeted and co-ordinated if the party was to recover its electoral position. 
 
The Liberal Democrats 
There is little to be said about the central management of constituency campaigns as far as the 
Liberal Democrats are concerned.  They have a very small central organisation and its role in 
constituency campaigning has not extended very far beyond providing training for 
campaigners and trying to encourage stronger efforts in targeted seats.  It is largely a matter 
of encouragement because the centre simply lacks the resources to do much more and the 
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organisation of constituency campaigns remains largely devolved to the constituencies 
themselves. 
 
Nonetheless, even the Liberal Democrats have not been entirely immune to the centralising 
trend seen in the other parties.  They now routinely devise a central targeting strategy and in 
2001 provided some limited financial help to key seats so that paid agents or part-time 
organisers could be employed by the constituencies concerned.  About 100 seats had some 
form of paid assistance but in many cases this involved sharing an organiser with other 
constituencies.  In addition, two Assistant Campaign Directors to assist and encourage the 
development of effective constituency campaign organisations.  Even so, the 2001 election 
confirmed that the Liberal Democrats have barely started on the road to the central 
management of constituency campaigns.  Their campaigns can be very impressive in target 
seats but this is largely due to local experience and enthusiasm.  Insofar as there is an input 
from the centre, it is usually informal. 
 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that, over the last three general elections, 
to varying degrees, the national headquarters of all three parties have come to play a larger 
role in constituency campaigning.  All three, as a matter of course, now target what they 
regard as key seats and attempt to direct resources into them.  The Liberal Democrats do not 
go much beyond this, but the Conservatives have clearly strengthened their central 
management of constituency campaigns and attempted to target the party’s local campaigning 
effort more effectively.  Labour has clearly gone furthest, however, now having a highly co-
ordinated constituency campaigning operation that is devised and directed from the centre, 
and planned as an integral element in the party’s overall campaign strategy.  We now 
consider how this increased central management has affected constituency campaigns on the 
ground. 
 
Developments in campaign techniques 
The increased efforts by the centre to manage constituency campaigns are aimed both at 
concentrating resources in key or target seats and encouraging local parties to take advantage 
of new and more effective campaigning techniques.  In this section we use the evidence from 
our surveys of election agents to examine recent developments in the ways that campaigns 
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are actually fought in the constituencies.  We begin by considering the extent to which 
constituency campaigns have moved away from more traditional campaigning techniques and 
started to embrace new ones. For this purpose we consider the campaigns of all three major 
parties together.   
 
 
Table 1.  Aspects of traditional campaigning - all parties 
 1992 1997 2001 
 
Mean number of campaign workers 54 49 37 
Mean number of polling day workers 138 109 73 
Mean number of public meetings 2.5 1.2 0.6 
% undertook doorstep canvassing 84 78 71 
Mean % of electorate canvassed on doorstep 28 22 17 
% issued traditional election address - 97 97 
Note: The Ns here and in Table 2 vary slightly for particular questions but are always close to 1003 
(1992), 1298 (1997) and 1250 (2001). The question about election addresses was not asked in 1992 
 
 
Table 1 presents data relating to six aspects of traditional campaigning in the last three 
elections.  In all but one case traditional activities appear to have declined.  The fall in the 
numbers of volunteer workers, both during the campaign and on polling day, may in part 
result from the development of new, less labour-intensive, campaigning techniques but may 
also reflect a more general disengagement from, or disenchantment with, politics.  The 
widespread view in 2001 that the outcome was inevitable also seems likely to have been a 
contributory factor.  Public campaign meetings have  been declining for many years and this 
has continued in the past few elections.   Traditionally, doorstep canvassing has been the key 
feature of a well-organised constituency campaign.  Its purpose was to identify and prepare 
lists of likely supporters who could then be mobilised by the ‘knocking up’ effort on election 
day and, before the advent of telephone canvassing, it was difficult to conceive of an 
alternative way in which this could be done.  The figures in the table show the percentages of 
responding constituency campaigns which undertook at least some doorstep canvassing and 
the mean percentage of the electorate canvassed in this way.  In 2001 a substantial majority 
of campaigns still did some doorstep canvassing but both sets of figures suggest that there has 
been a steady decline in this activity since 1992.  The only exception to the pattern of decline 
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concerns the issuing of a traditional election address.  There have been suggestions that 
candidates have been turning away from distributing a traditional address, with a photograph 
and message from the candidate, preferring instead to distribute jazzy leaflets, tabloid-style 
newspapers and the like (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992, pp. 233-4).  We asked about this in 
1997 and again in 2001 and, as can be seen, almost all campaign organisers report that they 
continue to produce an address.  Unlike public meetings, the traditional election address is far 
from dead.   
 
Table 2 presents comparable evidence on newer campaigning techniques which have been 
made possible by technological developments - in particular, the availability of relatively 
cheap and powerful PCs and the now nearly universal ownership of telephones.  The figures 
show that use of computers has steadily increased.  As early as 1992 a majority of campaigns 
used computers in one way or another, but the proportion increased in 1997 and again in 
2001, to the point where only a small minority of campaigns (almost all of them in hopeless 
seats) did not use computers.  Making serious use of computers for electioneering involves 
using a computerised version of the electoral register, which all three party headquarters can 
supply to their constituency organisations.  The data show a steady upward trend in the 
proportions of campaigns having a computerised register and also in those using specialised 
election software developed and made available from the centre.  The last stage of 
mobilisation in a campaign is the knocking-up of ‘promises’ or ‘pledges’ on polling day.  
This is a fairly sophisticated operation: at various times during the day, lists of people 
previously identified as supporters and who have not yet voted are prepared, so that 
volunteers can attempt to contact them.  In 1992 only minorities of campaigns used 
computers for this task, but the figures show that here again the proportion has steadily risen.   
 
Direct mail - the mailing of personalised letters to individual voters made possible by the 
advent of computers - was virtually unknown in 1992 but in 1997 and 2001 we asked 
respondents whether they used ‘direct mail to target individual voters previously identified as 
supporters or potential supporters’.  The results show only about 20 per cent of all campaigns 
using this technique but, as we shall see below, the figures for target constituencies are much 
more impressive. 
 
The 1992 election was the first in which telephone canvassing was used to any extent as an 
electioneering technique in Britain, but there were doubts about whether or not it might 
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infringe the tight laws on campaign spending.  By the following election the parties had 
resolved the legal question, at least to their own satisfaction, and contacting voters by 
telephone was being embraced as an essential campaign technique.  In 1992 we simply asked 
respondents whether they had undertaken any telephone canvassing during the campaign but 
additional questions were introduced in 1997 and 2001.  The data suggest that after a sharp 
rise in campaign telephone canvassing by constituencies in 1997 there was a slight falling 
back in 2001.  On the other hand there was an increase in the use of the telephone for 
knocking up.  However, our questions on telephone canvassing specifically concerned its use 
at constituency level and the bulk telephone canvassing is now organised centrally.   It seems 
likely, then, that the overall contribution made by telephone canvassing has increased even 
though there was a slight decline in its use at constituency level in 2001. 
 
 
Table 2.  Aspects of modern campaigning - all parties 
 1992 1997 2001 
% used computers  74 85 89 
% had computerised electoral register  45 65 71 
% used party software  35 56 61 
% used computers for knocking up lists 29 38 43 
% sent ‘substantial amount’ of direct mail - 23 20 
% some telephone canvassing in year before election  - 49  46 
% some telephone canvassing during campaign 32  52 50 
%  ‘knocked up’ by telephone - 38 45 
Note: For Ns see note to Table 1. 
 
 
Our evidence suggests, then, that constituency campaigns across the country are being 
modernised - more traditional methods of campaigning are in decline, and constituency 
organisations are increasingly adopting new techniques.  However, an important aspect of the 
central management of constituency campaigns is that central party officials want to focus 
resources and effort on key seats and, presumably, also want to encourage modernisation 
most strongly in these seats as well.  In the remainder of this section, therefore, we consider 
the parties separately and in each case compare their target and non-target seats.  
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Even given recent technological innovations, constituency campaigning remains a labour- 
intensive business and Table 3 gives details of the number of volunteer workers that the 
parties had in their target and non-target constituencies in 1992, 1997 and 2001.2   Both 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats have consistently had more workers in their target seats 
than in non-targets (although it should be remembered throughout this section that the Liberal 
Democrats always have a relatively small number of targets and concentrating efforts in them 
is easier than it is for the other parties).  The figures for the Conservatives reflect their poor 
targeting at the beginning of the period - in 1992 they had substantially more workers in their 
non-target seats than in targets - but in 1997 and 2001 they too had more workers in target 
seats.  The long-term decline in numbers of volunteers noted above is reflected in the table, of 
course, but it is striking that in 2001 Labour - by then thought to have the strongest and most 
effective organisation - had fewer workers in their target seats than either the Conservatives 
or the Liberal Democrats had in theirs. 
 
 
Table 3.  Mean number of campaign/polling day workers per constituency 
 1992 1997 2001 
 Targets Non- Targets Non- Targets Non- 
  targets  targets  targets 
 
Campaign Workers 
 Conservative 72 96 75 54 74 56 
 Labour 84 38 81 51 49 28 
 Lib Dem 98 24 200 20 97 13 
 
Polling Day Workers 
 Conservative 227 270 164 129 149 111 
 Labour 210 92 251 106 126 55 
 Lib Dem 193 52 260 47 151 23 
Note: For the number of cases on which tables 3 to 5 are based see footnote 2. 
 
 
Table 4 summarises further evidence about traditional aspects of campaigning in target and 
non-target constituencies.  In general, many fewer public meetings are organised in target 
seats - it has been recognised for some time that this is not an efficient way to communicate 
with the voters.  Interestingly, however, in both 1992 and 1997 the Liberal Democrats held 
large numbers of public meetings in their target seats.  This is probably because many of their 
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targets in these elections were in rural areas where there is a stronger tradition of holding 
election meetings.  In 2001, the number of meetings was much closer to the average since, 
following their success in 1997, relatively fewer Liberal Democrat targets were rural 
constituencies (some of these having become safe).   Doorstep canvassing, on the other hand, 
remains more common and more extensive in target than in non-target seats. While this is 
still a key activity, however, the proportions of the electorate reached in this way were clearly 
smaller in 2001 that they had been in 1992. 
 
As we have already seen, another very traditional aspect of campaigning - the printed election 
address - shows no sign of disappearing.  There are some signs that Labour and Liberal 
Democrat campaign organisers in target seats were turning to alternatives in 1997, but for 
Labour at least 2001 seems to have marked a return to normality.   
 
 
Table 4.  Traditional aspects of constituency campaigning  
 1992 1997 2001 
 Targets Non- Targets Non- Targets Non- 
  targets  targets  targets 
Mean number of public meetings 
 Conservative 3.2 3.9 3.5 1.6 0.5 1.4 
 Labour 1.1 1.9 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.4 
 Lib Dem 10.4 1.6 5.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 
% undertook doorstep canvassing  
 Conservative 96 93 98 85 94 76 
 Labour 97 84 86 82 94 71 
 Lib Dem 91 72 100 60 94 54 
Mean % of electorate canvassed on doorstep  
 Conservative 48 41 30 27 35 23 
 Labour 53 27 29 26 29 15 
 Lib Dem 29 11 33 10 19 7 
% issued traditional election address 
 Conservative - - 95 98 99 97 
 Labour - - 89 99 97 99 
 Lib Dem - - 86 95 85 96 
Note: The question on the election address was not asked in 1992. For the number of cases on which 
the table is based see footnote 2. 
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Table 5.  Innovations in constituency campaigning: computers, direct mail and telephone canvassing 
 1992 1997 2001 
 Targets Non- Targets Non- Targets Non- 
  targets  targets  targets 
% used computers  
 Conservative 93 76 100 86 99 87 
 Labour 96 70 100 88 100 91 
 Lib Dem 82 67 100 75 100 81 
% had computerised electoral register  
 Conservative 93 56 100 70 89 73 
 Labour 88 37 100 65 93 67 
 Lib Dem 64 24 100 46 100 60 
% used computers for knocking up lists 
 Conservative 69 38 75 44 84 43 
 Labour 66 20 63 41 74 42 
 Lib Dem 39 12 69 18 91 23 
% sent ‘substantial amount’ of direct mail 
 Conservative - - 52 24 47 17 
 Labour - - 79 21 67 16 
 Lib Dem - - 35 8 42 6 
% ‘substantial amount’ 
tele-canvassing during campaign 
 Conservative 29  12 42 22 35 14 
 Labour 18 4 80 17 59 16 
 Lib Dem 3 1 7 1 24 2 
%  ‘knocked up’ by telephone 
 Conservative - - 88 61 96 59 
 Labour - - 82 23 87 34 
 Lib Dem - - 62 11 85 19 
Note: For the number of cases on which the table is based see footnote 2.  
 
 
In Table 5 we show more detailed information about innovative aspects of campaigning - the 
use of computers, direct mail and telephones.  If the parties’ efforts at central management 
are being successful, we would expect to find greater use of these techniques in target seats 
and that is, indeed, what the table shows in every instance, with very striking differences 
between targets and non-targets in some cases.  The figures for use of direct mail and 
telephone canvassing by Labour in 1997 and 2001 are particularly impressive in this respect.  
More generally, however, it is clear that there was a good deal of innovation between 1992 
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and 1997 and that target seats were at the forefront of this.  We might have expected further 
increases in 2001 but here the evidence is more mixed.  On the one hand, Labour and 
Conservative campaigns in targets show decreases in the use of computerised registers, direct 
mail and telephone canvassing.  On the other, modernised polling day activities - using 
computers to produce knocking-up lists and doing knocking up by telephone - increased in all 
three parties. 
 
Finally in this section, we can summarise trends in constituency campaigning by referring to 
two overall indexes of campaign strength which allow us to compare the strength of 
constituency campaigns both within and between parties.  The first can be described as an 
index of traditional campaigning. This was originally devised in our study of the 1992 
election (Denver and Hands, 1997) and incorporates, among other things, the traditional 
aspects of campaigning we have discussed above.3  For present purposes we have 
recalculated the index using responses from all three elections (rather than each individually) 
and can thus also make comparisons across elections.  The relevant figures are shown in the 
first part of Table 6.  A campaign of average strength scores 100 while stronger campaigns 
score higher and weaker campaigns lower.  In this table we have also divided the non-target 
seats into those held and those not held by the party in question.4 
 
These data show that traditional campaigning has always been weakest in seats not held and 
not targeted by the party concerned. Labour and Liberal Democrat campaigns are always 
strongest in their targets while the Conservatives are always at least as strong in safer seats as 
in targets.  Finally, with the exception of Liberal Democrats, the intensity of traditional 
constituency campaigning has generally declined. 
 
To take account of recent developments, we devised a new index of campaign intensity in the 
2001 election which can also be calculated retrospectively for 1997 and which can be 
described as an index of modern campaigning.5  The second part of Table 6 shows scores 
obtained when we use responses for both 1997 and 2001 as the basis of calculation.  Scores 
on this index show that all three parties clearly fought their strongest campaigns in their 
target seats and their weakest in constituencies where they stood little chance of winning, 
indicating that the parties have been successful in focusing their constituency campaigning 
efforts where they really matter.  Labour campaigning in 2001 was distinctly less impressive 
than it had been in 1997 – perhaps because an easy victory was expected – but, even so, 
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Labour still had slightly stronger campaigns in their targets than the Conservatives or Liberal 
Democrats had in theirs. 
 
Table 6.   Mean Campaign Intensity Index Scores 1992-2001 
 Held  Not Held 
 Not Targets Targets Not targets All 
Traditional Index 
 
Conservative 1992 139 134 94 124 
 1997 127 127 91 110 
 2001 128 127 83 110 
 
Labour  1992 114 143 93 112 
 1997 114 141 107 115 
 2001 105 126 83 106 
 
Lib Dem 1992 - 123 79 82 
 1997 - 146 78 83 
 2001 113 133 76 81 
 
Modern Index 
 
Conservative 1997 126 133 94 112 
 2001 127 134 87 113 
  
Labour 1997 110 152 105 113 
 2001 106 137 86 105 
   
Lib Dem 1997 - 140 76 81 
 2001 112 132 71 78 
Note: For the numbers of cases on which the table is based see footnote 4. 
 
 
Nonetheless, while the strength of Conservative ‘modern’ campaigning was similar in 1997 
and 2001, both Labour and Liberal Democrats fell back quite sharply. How is this to be 
explained?  In Labour’s case it may be a sign that the modernising drive had begun to run out 
of steam.  As we have argued elsewhere, however, a more likely explanation might be found 
in the political context of the 2001 election (Denver et al., 2002).  Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats had more seats to defend and the Conservatives needed to win more than usual.  
As a result, a significantly greater number of seats were targeted than in 1997.  Labour, for 
example, had 148 targets as compared with 90 in 1997, while the Conservatives had 180 
compared with 100 in 1997.  It is almost inevitable in these circumstances that centrally 
managed targeting of resources will be less effective. 
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The Impact of Local Campaigning 
Recent research has persuaded many that, contrary to the previous orthodoxy, local 
campaigning can make a significant difference to election outcomes at constituency level.  
We have provided detailed analyses on this question, using our data on campaign intensity, 
elsewhere (Denver and Hands, 1997, 1998; Denver et al., 2002) and so include only a brief 
summary of our evidence on this point here. 
 
Various measures of electoral change have been used to analyse the impact of campaigning. 
Our preferred measure of party performance is change in the share of the electorate won 
between two elections since this is arguably the best indicator of the success or otherwise of 
campaigning.6  Unfortunately, major changes in constituency boundaries between 1992 and 
1997 mean that for 1997 we are forced to use change in vote share.  In practice, we have 
operationalised change in party performance by incorporating electorate or vote share in the 
preceding election into regression models predicting share in the election being analysed. 
 
Table 7.  Constituency campaign intensity and party performance 1992-2001 
 Con Campaign Lab Campaign LD Campaign 
 Intensity Intensity Intensity 
 
1992  (dependent variable = share of electorate) 
  Conservative -0.11 -0.39 -0.00 
  Labour 0.95 1.80 -1.20 
  Lib Dem 0.59 -1.90 2.68 
  (N) (265) (356) (383) 
 
1997  (dependent variable = share of vote) 
  Conservative 0.22 -0.53 0.01 
  Labour 0.01 1.92 -2.33 
  Lib Dem 0.65 -1.12 3.07 
  (N) (434) (455) (410) 
 
2001  (dependent variable = share of electorate) 
  Conservative 0.35 -0.24 -0.04 
  Labour 0.06 0.86 -1.01 
  Lib Dem 0.14 -0.20 1.49 
  (N) (374) (442) (431) 
Note:  The ‘traditional’ index of campaign intensity is used for 1992; the ‘modern’ index for 1997 and 
2001.   Statistically significant coefficients (p< 0.05) are shown in bold.  Coefficients for performance 
in previous election, region and incumbency are not shown. 
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Table 7 shows unstandardised regression coefficients for the campaign intensity variables 
deriving from a series of regression analyses with, in each case, the relevant party 
performance as the dependent variable, and each party’s campaign intensity index entered 
separately as a predictor variable.  In all cases, party performance in the previous election, 
incumbency and region were also included in the model as controls but, for the sake of 
clarity, the relevant coefficients are not reported. 
 
These coefficients give an indication of the impact of each party’s campaigning both on its 
own performance and on those of the other two and, overall, Labour campaigning  appears to 
have been the most effective.  In all three elections more intense Labour campaigning in the 
constituencies was associated with a better Labour performance and poorer results for the 
other parties, and all but two of the coefficients are statistically significant.  Strong Liberal 
Democrat campaigning was also consistently associated with significantly better results for 
the party and with poorer results for Labour but the data suggest that it had no impact on 
Conservative performance.  The coefficients for Conservative campaigning are especially 
interesting.  In 1992 stronger Conservative campaigning was significantly associated with 
better Labour performances and in 1997 with better Liberal Democrat performances but in 
neither case was their a significant impact on the performance of the Conservatives 
themselves. We have discussed these apparently counter-intuitive effects of Conservative 
campaigning elsewhere (Denver and Hands, 1996).  In 2001, however, while Conservative 
campaigning had no significant effects on how the other parties performed, the party, for the 
first time, did significantly better where its campaigns were stronger.  This may be due to the 
different context of the 2001 election - unlike in 1992 and 1997 the Conservatives were now 
attacking their opponents rather than defending their position.  But it may also reflect 
increased efforts at party headquarters to modernise constituency campaigning and more 
effective targeting than in the past.  On the other hand, comparing the size of the coefficients 
for Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 1992 and 2001 suggests a decline in the impact of 
constituency campaigns on their own performances.  This may again reflect the changed 
circumstances in 2001, although it may also indicate that voters are becoming more 
impervious to the increasingly sophisticated campaign techniques and appeals used by the 
parties. 
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Conclusion 
Prior to the 1990s, the parties operated a sort of de facto division of labour with respect to 
campaigning.  Central headquarters largely concentrated on the persuasive elements of 
campaigning and communicated with the electorate via the national campaign and the mass 
media.  Mobilisation - actually getting supporters to the polls - was the task of activists in the 
constituencies.  As we have seen, party headquarters have now come to play a much larger 
part in the mobilisation process and in doing so have introduced new strategies and 
techniques to constituency campaigning.  Moreover, the distinction between persuasion and 
mobilisation has become even more blurred than it used to be.  Campaign efforts in the 
constituencies now involve much more than simply identifying supporters during the short 
campaign and getting them out to vote on polling day.  Rather, the long-term constituency 
campaign aims to ‘build relationships’ with voters, identifying their concerns, tailoring 
messages to their needs and keeping them supplied with relevant information.  The electoral 
pay-off from all of this activity is not huge but it is nonetheless significant and could be vital 
in a close race.  Constituency campaigns - at least in seats targeted by the parties - are no 
longer the ‘Cinderellas’ of general election campaigns and that is a change that is unlikely to 
be reversed in the near future. 
 
Notes 
1   The surveys were conducted in connection with ESRC-supported studies of constituency 
campaigning (grant reference numbers Y304 25 3004 (1992); R000222027 (1997) and 
R000239396 (2001)). 
 
2 The numbers of cases on which Tables 3 to 5 are based are as follows: 
 1992 1997 2001 
 Targets Non- Targets Non- Targets Non- 
  targets  targets  targets 
 Conservative 45 220 64 370 103 272 
 Labour 94 261 65 390 96 347 
 Lib Dem 33 350 30 379 33 399 
 
3   This index was constructed by first using survey responses to create new variables measuring 
activity on seven dimensions of campaigning - preparation, organisation, manpower, canvassing, 
leafleting, use of computers and the polling day operation.  A principal components analysis of 
these seven variables then generated one factor and the factor scores for each case constitute a 
standardized campaign strength score (for details see Denver and Hands, 1997, pp. 246-55). 
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4 The numbers of cases on which Table 6 is based are as follows: 
 Held  Not Held 
 Not Target Target Not Target Total 
 Con 1992 136 45 84 265 
  1997 166 64 204 434 
  2001 122 103 150 375 
 Lab 1992 98 94 163 355 
  1997 168 65 222 455 
  2001 183 96 164 443 
 Lib Dem 1992 - 33 350 383 
  1997 - 30 379 410 
  2001 10 33 389 432 
 
5 This index modifies the first by adding two new campaign dimensions - one relating to targeting 
of leaflets and use of direct mail and the other concerning the use of telephones for canvassing 
(both before and during the campaign) and knocking up.  In addition, new questions were 
incorporated into the original preparation, canvassing, computers and polling day dimensions 
(see Denver et al., 2002). 
 
6   Change in the share of votes received - which is perhaps a more obvious measure - is actually an 
indirect consequence of the primary aim of campaigning, which is to maximise the number of 
votes received by the party concerned.  This is more appropriately measured by change in the 
share of the electorate. 
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